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Abstract 
Inter-municipal cooperation is gaining in popularity in many Western countries, making it 
a matter of pressing importance to better understand what factors might contribute to the 
success of such arrangements. This article focuses on three Norwegian inter-municipal 
cooperative arrangements in the field of child welfare that are deemed to be successful, 
and the aim is to identify common features across the three cases with a focus on the 
governance structures of the collaborations. The study combines document studies and 
qualitative interviews, and reveals three main factors that can explain success: a sense of 
urgency, political and administrative support combined with incremental processes. The 
study also indicates that these factors interact, and can thus not be viewed as explanations 
taken individually. Furthermore, the potential negative effects on allocative efficiency are 
highlighted. Since the success of inter-municipal cooperation seems at least partly to 
depend on whether the task in focus is “moved out” of the ordinary activity and embed-
ded in a higher political and administrative level, it is argued that this may further frag-
ment the municipalities’ ability to make priorities between sectors and services.  
 
Introduction 
Inter-municipal cooperation is not a new phenomenon, neither in the Scandina-
vian countries (Baldersheim, Fimreite, & Strand, 1992; Haug, Baldersheim, & 
Øgård, 2011) nor in other European countries (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010; 
Rudie Hulst, Montfort, Haveri, Airaksinen, & Kelly, 2009; R. Hulst & Montfort, 
2007). Although historical data are scarce, there are indications that inter-
municipal cooperation in different forms is becoming more popular both in Eu-
rope and in the US (Anell & Mattison, 2009; Bel, Brown, & Warner, 2014; Bel 
& Warner, 2015; Blåka, Tjerbo, & Zeiner, 2012; ECON, 2006; D. I. Jacobsen, 
2014a). The exception is Denmark, where inter-municipal cooperation has de-
creased since the amalgamation of municipalities in 2007. However, the Danish 
case highlights another important point: not even the radical amalgamation in 
Denmark has eradicated the need for cooperation across municipal borders, 
although studies indicate that inter-municipal cooperation was cut in half (Kjær, 
2011). 
Given the scale and scope of inter-municipal cooperation, the research on 
what constitutes and leads to success and failure is strangely sparse. Most recent 
studies concentrate on the basic characteristics of the organization of inter-
municipal cooperation, such as general types of structure (for instance contract 
versus joint organization), measuring success by economic gains (Bel, Fageda, 
& Mur, 2014; Bel & Warner, 2015, 2016; Warner, 2011), or on reasons to engage  
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in inter-municipal cooperation instead of trying to achieve results on one’s own 
or through other organizational arrangements like outsourcing and privatization 
(Bel & Warner, 2016). Very few studies focus on the role of the governance 
structure of the inter-municipal cooperation in explaining success, i.e. how inter-
municipal cooperative arrangements are organized vertically and how they are 
linked to the levels of administrative and political leadership in the respective 
municipalities. 
Furthermore, most studies concentrate on municipal services that can be de-
fined as “hard” and “technical”, such as solid waste management (Dijkgraaf & 
Gradus, 2013; Zafra-GÓMez, Prior, DÍAz, & LÓPez-HernÁNdez, 2013), refuse 
collection (Gradus, Dijkgraaf, & Wassenaar, 2014), water supply (Mattisson & 
Ramberg, 2015), fire protection, management of parks and recreational areas, 
and parking (Jung & Jeong, 2013). Most of these services could be characterized 
as rather easy to monitor, insofar as both outcomes and processes are measura-
ble, and thus outsourceable to contract management (Brown & Potoski, 2003; 
Hefetz & Warner, 2012). 
This study aims to fill this research gap by pursuing the following research 
question: How do governance structures affect the success of inter-municipal 
cooperation?  
Empirically, this study focuses on an area of municipal service provision 
that could be defined as complex, in the sense that both processes and outcomes 
are hard to measure objectively: child welfare or child protection (Hamilton & 
Bundy-Fazioli, 2013). Moreover, child welfare is a highly specialized service – a 
small municipality might not deal with more than 2–3 cases a year. Although 
each case may be time-consuming, they do not usually represent a workload 
considered sufficient to engage a full-time employee specializing in these types 
of tasks alone. The consequence is that municipalities in Norway must either 
allocate this service to persons with other tasks in their portfolio, with an at-
tendant loss of focus and quality, try to hire a person in a part-time position, or 
engage in cooperation with other municipalities (Ekspertutvalget, 2014). 
The article is structured as follows. First, we discuss the notion of success in 
cooperative arrangements, since this is essential to the choice of cases for the 
empirical study. Second, we investigate possible causes of success, focusing on 
the governance structure of the cooperation. In addition, we discuss other im-
portant factors that contribute to success in inter-municipal cooperation. As there 
is limited research on this area when it comes to inter-municipal cooperation, we 
rely on insights from similar research on network governance (E.-H. Klijn, 2008; 
Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, & Nasi, 2010; Verweij, Klijn, Edelenbos, & Van 
Buuren, 2013) and inter-organizational relationships (IOR) (Cropper, Ebers, 
Huxham, & Ring, 2008). Third, we discuss the empirical design (what character-
izes child welfare services in Norway, selection of three cases) and method, 
focusing on the use of qualitative data with a combination of secondary data 
(reports, evaluations, etc.) and interviews. The fourth section contains the empir-
ical analysis: first analyses of each case, then a cross-case analysis. Finally, we 
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discuss the findings in relation to the expectations defined in the theoretical 
section.  
 
Defining success in inter-municipal cooperation 
Success, as in efficiency, is clearly a multi-dimensional phenomenon (see Babi-
ak 2009; Human & Provan 2000; Kaplan & Norton 2010; Provan & Milward 
2001). At least three different dimensions should be taken into consideration 
when judging the success or failure of service provision: economic efficiency, 
quality and governance (Jacobsen 2014). The most commonly discussed dimen-
sion seems to be economic efficiency or productivity. It is commonly assumed 
that inter-municipal cooperation might create economies of scale, in the sense 
that the mean cost per unit produced decreases. Economies of scale occur be-
cause it becomes possible to exploit resources like machines, buildings and em-
ployees to the full, thus avoiding slack. Empirical research indicates that inter-
municipal cooperation does indeed realize some benefits from economies of 
scale (Bel, Fageda, et al., 2014; Bel & Warner, 2015; Hefetz & Warner, 2012). 
However, as noted in the introduction, the relevant studies mainly investigate 
municipal tasks that could be termed “technical”. It is hard to find studies of 
service areas for which the economic benefits of cooperation are harder to de-
fine, such as education, social welfare and health care.  
The second dimension is quality of services. Although it is difficult to meas-
ure the quality of services, especially complex services (Schreyer, 2012), three 
types of quality are often distinguished: output/outcome, process and structure 
(Donabedian, 2005). “Output/outcome” refers to the services provided, and is 
often measured by asking users or clients for their opinion on the services they 
have received, or by more objective measures related to outcomes (getting a job, 
getting well, finishing school, etc.) (Kelly & Swindell, 2002). “Process” refers to 
the degree to which the work itself is conducted according to some standard – 
usually professional guidelines for what constitutes good professional work. 
“Structural quality” refers to the input factors in the production of services, i.e. 
the quality of staff, the size of the collegium, physical space and available 
equipment, and so on (Bigras et al., 2010). The three types of quality are of 
course closely linked, given the assumption that input factors (structure) affect 
processes that in turn affects outputs/outcomes.  
Much of the debate on inter-municipal cooperation in Norway has focused 
on structural quality, and linked structural quality to a minimum size of a service 
(number of people employed) that would ensure a sufficient professional colle-
gium and sufficient “robustness” (Ekspertutvalget 2014). A larger collegium is 
assumed to have many positive effects: increased robustness in cases of sickness 
or absences among staff, more professionalism in virtue of having more col-
leagues with whom to discuss different issues, a broader professional knowledge 
base, and a more attractive workplace that can offer both colleagues and full-
time positions (Fox & Gurley 2006). All these factors are assumed to increase 
the quality of both processes and outputs/outcomes. The same considerations are 
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brought up in debates about the optimal size of municipalities all over the world 
(Dollery, Byrnes, & Crase, 2008; Dollery & Grant, 2013; Drew, Kortt, & 
Dollery, 2015).  
A third dimension of success is democratic governance. Much of the current 
discussion concerning inter-municipal cooperation has raised the question 
whether such arrangements lead to a loss of political control (Fimreite & 
Medalen, 2005; D. I. Jacobsen, 2014a; Pierre, 2011; Røiseland & Vabo, 2016). 
Some studies indicate that politicians lose insight into complex inter-municipal 
cooperative arrangements, that they feel removed from the day-to-day manage-
ment, and that power is transferred to the cooperation (E. Zeemering, 2016; E. S. 
Zeemering, 2012). If so, inter-municipal cooperation may be regarded as a threat 
to democracy (Gjertsen, 2014; Dag Ingvar Jacobsen, 2015; E.-H. Klijn & 
Skelcher, 2007). 
Economic efficiency and quality may be regarded as tradeoffs: a decrease in 
the cost of production may be a consequence of a decrease in the quality of ser-
vices provided (lo Storto 2016). There may also be a tradeoff between political 
control and governance, on the one hand, and quality and efficiency, on the oth-
er. Intrusion into professional production of services may sometimes affect the 
efficiency of professional work (Provan & Milward, 2001). Measuring the suc-
cess of inter-municipal cooperation has to take these different tradeoffs into 
account.  
 
Governance structure and success 
Given that success is a multidimensional concept, one should also assume that 
there are multiple causal factors relevant to achieving success. These causal 
factors are usually grouped into three categories: contextual, structural and func-
tional/processual (Turrini et al., 2010). In this study, we focus on the structural 
characteristics or, more specifically, on the governance structure – or, using a 
basic concept from organization theory, the vertical specialization – of inter-
municipal cooperation.  
In general, vertical specialization addresses the governance structure of the 
cooperative arrangement (M. Egeberg, Gornitzka, & Trondal, 2016). The first 
dimension of vertical specialization is the autonomy of the inter-municipal co-
operation of its members. Although strangely missing from the research on inter-
municipal cooperation, operational autonomy is central to research on agencifi-
cation (Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield, & Smullen, 2004). There are several similari-
ties between a (semi-)autonomous agency and an inter-municipal cooperation 
insofar as many – if not most – inter-municipal cooperative arrangements are 
organized into separate, formal entities (Anell & Mattison, 2009; R. Hulst & 
Montfort, 2007; D. I. Jacobsen, 2014a; Røiseland & Vabo, 2016). The reason to 
focus on  autonomy is increased efficiency through letting “the managers man-
age” (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2015). The flip-side of autonomy, 
however, is a possible lack of democratic accountability and control (Bjørnholt 
& Salomonsen, 2015; E.-H. Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). Elected politicians and 
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traditional hierarchical leaders lose some of their steering power when they are 
unable to give direct orders or instruct the semi-autonomous entities. Thus, inter-
municipal cooperation may lead to some kind of “democratic deficiency”.  
However, inter-municipal cooperative arrangements are not completely au-
tonomous, insofar as they are still connected to both the political and the admin-
istrative levels in the participating municipalities. This coupling usually takes on 
the form of some kind of board of directors, general assembly, or both. These 
bodies become the instruments for governing the cooperations, on the one hand, 
and the cooperations’ coupling to their “mother-organizations”, on the other. 
Thus, how these bodies are designed becomes essential, and this factor consti-
tutes the second dimension in vertical specialization. The arguably most im-
portant design dimension is who the representatives in these steering bodies are 
and who they represent. The more a steering body of a cooperation consists of 
centrally located politicians and administrative leaders (for instance mayors and 
CEOs), the more vertically integrated the cooperation will be (Keast & Mandell, 
2014; Mandell & Keast, 2008; Turrini et al., 2010) . Although this might in-
crease the possibilities for hierarchical control of the cooperation, it will also 
represent a link for the cooperation to the important resources controlled by 
these actors. It may accordingly seem reasonable to assume that tight integration 
will increase an inter-municipal cooperation’s propensity for success.  
As much of the governance of inter-municipal cooperative arrangements 
will take the form of indirect steering, the format of the financing also becomes a 
critical factor (Turrini et al., 2010; Van Dooren et al., 2015). If the financial 
support is dependent on constant negotiations between municipalities, much of 
the energy of the administrative personnel in the cooperation must be used to 
secure sufficient funding. The more stable and predictable funding becomes, the 
more attention can be devoted to performing the central task.  
As noted at the outset, both contextual and functional/processual factors may 
also be important in explaining success. Contextual factors are related to the fact 
that any type of cooperative arrangement is embedded in a larger physical and 
institutional environment (Granovetter, 1973; Knox, Savage, & Harvey, 2006). 
In the present study, however, we focus on inter-municipal cooperation within 
the same national (Norway) and functional (child welfare) context, so the gen-
eral contextual factors will be similar for any cooperation. Accordingly, we 
restrict our focus to some factors of importance that also vary within these larger 
contexts. First, the physical characteristics of the environment become important 
(D. I. Jacobsen, 2009). Physical distances between members in the cooperation 
may increase costs, and may thus impair interaction and in turn make it more 
difficult to establish good working relations. Second, as emphasized by Provan 
and Milward (2001), resource munificence in the area covered by a cooperation 
seems to make cooperation work more smoothly. This includes (financial) sup-
port to the cooperation from external institutions, which in our case would mean 
support of inter-municipal cooperation from other public institutions at the coun-
ty or state level. Although the effect of resource munificence has been ques-
tioned in more complex networks (Weijie, 2016), it still seems to be of great 
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importance in more formalized cooperative arrangements related to public ser-
vice provision (Cristofoli & Markovic, 2016; Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015). 
Finally, one has to take into account the similarity between the cooperating mu-
nicipalities (Bel & Warner, 2015). Similarity is closely associated with trust, as 
one will usually have higher levels of trust in someone similar to oneself than in 
someone very different (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). As pointed 
out by many, high levels of trust among members seem to lower the costs of 
cooperation (Hoornbeek, Beechey, & Pascarella, 2016; Jung & Jeong, 2013; E. 
H. Klijn et al., 2016). Thus, we would expect cooperation to function more 
smoothly between municipalities that are similar with regard to important char-
acteristics such as size, economy and politics, than between dissimilar munici-
palities.  
Functional or process-related factors are connected to work-related experi-
ences in the cooperation, and are based on the assumption that previous experi-
ences influence present relations (Hall, Taylor, & Taylor, 1996; Sydow, 
Schreyogg, & Koch, 2009). First of all, it is important for success that there is an 
acknowledged need for formalized cooperation. Establishing inter-municipal 
cooperation implies extensive use of resources in organizing, staffing and devel-
oping models for financing. In addition, creating a co-operation of this type will 
also involve extensive change in the existing organization, and change is in 
many instances perceived as stressful and thus often met with resistance (D. I. 
Jacobsen, 2014b). Thus, it is important that all participants accept the need for a 
cooperative arrangement, and acceptance seems to come easier if there is a 
common perception of “necessity” (Benson, 1975) or ”urgency” (Kotter, 2008). 
Such common perceptions usually derive from a recognized crisis or shock 
(Gersick, 1991; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006). Others emphasize that positive experi-
ences early in a co-operation may function as “small wins” (Weick & Quinn, 
1999) that create a sense of early success, and in turn increase the probability of 
later success (Quinn, 1980) – a positive, self-reinforcing circle (Masuch, 1985). 
Finally, it is important to understand the effect of being a “first mover” (Short & 
Payne, 2008). Usually associated with business organizations operating in a 
market, the effect of being a “first mover” is also clearly relevant to public or-
ganizations. Being a first mover may suggest “modernity” and “pro-activity”, 
increase legitimacy, and in turn increase support, both symbolically and finan-
cially (Scott, 2008). As more cooperative arrangements arise, the competition for 
attention and resources becomes stronger, and it may be more difficult to get the 
same type of support as first movers may experience.  
 
Method and data 
This study focuses on one aspect of municipal activities: child welfare or child 
protective services. One may argue that this is a rather narrow focus, thus limit-
ing the transferability of the findings (Heen, 2009). On the other hand, the field 
represents an extension of the areas usually covered in studies on inter-municipal 
success. As noted initially, most previous studies focus on rather “hard” services, 
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like water supply or waste handling, where either the processes or the results are 
tangible and relatively easy to measure. Child welfare is very different from 
these services when it comes to the complexity of measuring results. The role of 
child welfare services in Norway is to detect child abuse (usually based on in-
formation given by or retrieved from school personnel, police, health personnel 
or others), to intervene, and to provide measures either in the home of the child 
or outside the home, including assigning foster parents or moving the child to an 
institution. In addition to being extremely complex, child welfare services some-
times involve use of public authority, when taking children out of the home 
despite protests from parents or other family representatives. Finally, child wel-
fare services are highly specialized and professionalized, and even medium-sized 
municipalities may have to join resources to be able to provide services of suffi-
cient quality. It is thus representative of this type of municipal task, where inter-
municipal cooperation may be necessary or beneficial even if large scale amal-
gamations will be completed (Ekspertutvalget, 2014).  
Success is clearly a relative concept, i.e. a matter of something being better 
than something else. To say anything about success one has to compare, either in 
static terms (comparing successful co-operations with unsuccessful ones) or in 
dynamic terms (comparing a situation being more successful than it was on an 
earlier point in time). In this study, we focus on comparison over time; that is, 
we compare the situation before and after inter-municipal cooperative arrange-
ments were made. The main research strategy was thus to study child welfare 
provisions that achieved success after the establishment of inter-municipal co-
operations. In doing so, we also tracked down critical events in the processes of 
establishing the inter-municipal cooperative arrangements.  
One challenge when studying public services in general, and even more 
when studying highly complex service provisions like child welfare, is that it is 
difficult to establish a clear standard for what constitutes success or failure 
(Provan & Milward, 2001). Measuring the economic efficiency of such services 
is extremely difficult, if not impossible. To meet this challenge, we used several 
indicators in a stepwise selection procedure. First, we mapped all inter-municipal 
co-operations established between 1990 and 2010. Second, we used national 
statistics (mean time processing in each case, arrears) to find co-operations that 
had improved the situation along given parameters after the start of the coopera-
tion. Since such quantitative data are very sensitive to random influences, we 
also searched for other evaluations of inter-municipal child welfare services 
(Brandtzæg & Sanda, 2003; Brandzæg, 2006; Flermoen & Sanda, 2004; Kvello 
& Wendelberg, 2003; Langset & Vinsand, 2010; Nilsen & Vinsand, 2007; Sand, 
Aasetre, & Lysø, 2007; Sletnes, 2003; Tjerbo, 2009; Vinsand & Nilsen, 2008; 
Wendelborg, Sand, & Aasetre, 2008). Fourth, we consulted one of the leading 
scientific institutions in the field of child welfare or child protective services (the 
University of Agder), and asked what co-operations they would define as “flag-
ships” within the field. Finally, based on the previous information, we consulted 
leaders in the so-called regional councils in Norway, a voluntary association of 
municipalities around the totality of inter-municipal arrangements in the region. 
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These leaders are documented to have good oversight over cooperation in the 
region (Brandtzæg & Sanda, 2003).  
This process resulted in three cases with a high level of agreement between 
many factors that indicate success: 
 
• A significant decrease in the backlog of cases.  
• A significant reduction of time used in the proceedings. 
• A reduction in the number of complaints on decisions. 
• Increased stability of qualified personnel. 
• High professional quality (as evaluated by university and regional 
council experts). 
 
In the following we will denote these co-operations “Mid”, “West” and “North”. 
The availability of three cases makes a comparative case analysis possible. We 
will describe these co-operations in more detail in the analysis of each case. The 
research strategy was to try to find common factors that explain success across 
these three cases. These cases are both structurally (number of participants, for-
mal type of cooperation) and contextually (geography, economy of participant, 
physical distances) different, which indicates that these factors may be of lesser 
importance in understanding success (Yin, 2014). On the other hand, finding 
common success factors across different cases increases the probability that 
these are more general explanatory factors, and not just coincidentelly correlated 
with success in a unique case (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).  
First, we went through several documents (yearly reports, cooperation 
agreements, minutes from meeting, web pages, audit reports) to map out the 
more objective structural characteristics of each cooperative arrangement. These 
data sources were used for mapping information on characteristics like formal 
governance structure (organization chart), number of participants, mode of fi-
nancing, physical location, etc. In addition, during the autumn of 2010, we con-
ducted 29 telephone interviews with leaders of regional councils (3), mayors 
(10) and chief administrative officers (12) in the participating municipalities, as 
well as leaders (and one assistant leader) of the three co-operations (4). In total, 
13 respondents represented “West”, 10 respondents represented “Mid”, while 6 
represented “North”. The somewhat unequal number of respondents per coop-
eration is a consequence of the difference in the number of participants in each. 
Respondents were chosen according to the criterion of breadth in views on the 
cooperation, so as to avoid single source bias (Patton, 1999). As the focus was 
the importance of the governance structure, we selected respondents representing 
this structure. Interviews were conducted to retrieve information on aspects that 
were not possible to get from written documents, like previous experiences with 
cooperation, sense of urgency, how important a certain governance arrangement 
was deemed to be, etc. An interview guide was developed so that the interviews 
could be regarded as semi-structured data.  
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Analysis 
The analysis was conducted in two stages. First, each case was analyzed sepa-
rately to establish the unique success factors in each. Second, we looked for 
commonalities in explanatory factors across the cases.  
 
“Mid”-cooperation 
This cooperation consists of five municipalities, with one being much larger in 
terms of inhabitants (12795)1 than the other four (ranging from 670 to 3577 
inhabitants). The smaller municipalities did not have their own units devoted to 
child welfare. Child welfare in these municipalities was organized as an integrat-
ed part (ranging between 20 and 50 %) of the job of the leader of the health and 
social services in the municipality. Only the largest municipality had a separate 
group counting 4.6 full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) with responsibility for 
child welfare. An audit remarked that these four municipalities were not dimen-
sioned according to national laws.  
The inter-municipal cooperation started as a national experiment with excep-
tion from the then-operating law in 2004. In this experiment, the four smaller 
municipalities were allowed to delegate the responsibility for child welfare to the 
largest municipality, and transfer resources accordingly. The main office was 
located in the largest municipality, but local offices – under the jurisdiction of 
the individual municipalities – were maintained in the four smaller ones. Re-
sources were thus spread out across all participating municipalities. Minutes 
from meetings in the municipal councils indicate worries about lack of political 
and administrative coordination of the services.  
In 2009 the services were reorganized, placing the responsibility for child 
welfare in all five municipalities in one unit with one leader. In addition, a com-
mon political board was set up consisting of elected politicians from all partici-
pating municipalities. Within this board, a political committee with child welfare 
as its sole responsibility was created. From 2008 to 2010, FTEs in the child wel-
fare services increased from 6.7 to 11. The new leader of the reorganized coop-
eration emphasized how the fusion of services into one formal unit increased the 
political focus on child welfare in general, leading to the significant increase in 
resources. She pointed out that: 
 
Reorganizing child welfare into one common unit increased both the 
administrative and the political attention given to the service. In par-
ticular, there is a previously unseen political awareness. Now I am 
able to work actively directly toward the political level, and I can see 
and feel that they have acquired an increased insight and understand-
ing of the field. Never before have mayors in the region talked so 
much about child welfare (…) This service has become a central part 
of the political debate in the common council. 
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Strong anchoring at the political level is corroborated by the interviews with the 
mayors in the participating municipalities. One of the mayors put it the following 
way: 
 
We receive much more information. Previously we only got infor-
mation about the cooperation once a year, and through the yearly re-
ports. Today we have a constant dialogue. The politic anchoring is 
much stronger than it was before in the regional council. Especially 
the creation of a committee for child welfare in the common council 
has been important for political anchoring. 
 
In short, it seems as though organized attention around the child welfare services 
also resulted in child welfare becoming a prioritized area in all participating 
municipalities, resulting in more political attention, and, in turn, more resources. 
One of the mayors voiced some second thoughts on the development: 
 
There is a danger that … it is important for us to see the whole pic-
ture … that municipal services are treated equally. In spite of the big 
challenges we face in child welfare we need to maintain focus on 
other services as well. 
 
Still, this was a single voice among the politicians. All the other mayors under-
lined the need to strengthen child welfare. Some administrative leaders, although 
they also emphasized the need for more resources to child welfare, were worried 
that other municipal areas may not receive the same level of attention as child 
welfare. 
 
“West”-cooperation 
“West” consists of six municipalities, ranging in size (inhabitants) from 1404 to 
3641. Thus, there is, unlike in the “Mid”-cooperation case, no municipality that 
is significantly larger than the others. However, the economic differences be-
tween the municipalities are large, and they cover large physical areas with ru-
dimentary infrastructure, resulting in extensive traveling time between municipal 
centers. The small size of the municipalities has forced them to cooperate on a 
large range of municipal services, although all five are not necessarily cooperat-
ing in all areas. Cooperation within the field of child welfare goes back to the 
early 1980s, but the cooperation was not formalized until 1993. At that time, the 
cooperation was classified as a “host-cooperation”, indicating that all resources 
were delegated to one of the municipalities. Host responsibilities were to rotate 
among the participating municipalities. This cooperation had its own administra-
tive board, consisting of the health and social chief executive officers in all the 
municipalities. 
Two reports done by the internal audit officers in two of the municipalities 
indicated a high level of conflict between the municipalities, primarily as an 
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upshot of different economic situations in the municipalities, resulting in prob-
lems of coordination. In 1996 the cooperation was reorganized. A new board, 
with representation only from the host municipality, was put together. Even 
though the board was still administrative, it was now anchored at the top admin-
istrative level in the host municipality. This board consisted of three persons: the 
chief executive officer (CEO), the chief financial officer (CFO) – both represent-
ing the host municipality – and the leader of the child welfare unit. The reorgani-
zation of the board was characterized by all those involved as an important 
crossroads, as child welfare was lifted out of the health and social sector in the 
participating municipalities and anchored at a higher administrative level. One of 
the CEOs expressed the reorganization thusly: 
 
The reorganization of the board in 1996 was crucial for the continu-
ing cooperation on child welfare in the region. The economic situa-
tions in the participating municipalities are enormously different, and 
the reorganization punctuated each municipality’s possibility to pur-
sue special interests. 
 
In 2004 the cooperation entered a new phase. As a national experiment, based on 
evaluations indicating a lack of political steering of the cooperation, the six mu-
nicipalities were allowed to organize child welfare as an “inter-municipal com-
pany”. The number of FTEs increased from 10.2 in 2003 to 11.5 in 2005, a sig-
nificantly higher increase than the national level in the same period. In practice, 
this led to the creation of a supervisory board (“representantskap”) consisting of 
the mayors of the participating municipalities. At the same time the regional 
council, where the same mayors were represented, decided to define the coopera-
tion as a prioritized area and a “flagship” for the region. In this period, the re-
gional council took on a rather active role vis-à-vis the cooperation, including 
ensuring some external financing. All respondents characterized this support as 
very important for the success of the cooperation. One of the mayors put it like 
this:  
 
The regional council is very strong and central to the region, and 
child welfare became an area that received a lot of attention … 
 
With the strong political representation in the regional council (all mayors repre-
sented, as well as representatives of the political “opposition”), the political 
anchoring of the cooperation became very strong.  
The “company model” was discarded in 2009, and replaced with a host mu-
nicipality model. The changes from the previous model were rather marginal, as 
the administrative responsibilities were still placed at the top administrative level 
in the host municipality, and the regional council took over the role as superviso-
ry board. The political anchoring was, however, somewhat weakened as respon-
sibility for child welfare was moved from a unit with sole responsibility for the 
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field (supervisory board), to a more multifunctional arena (regional council) 
where child welfare had to “compete” with other municipal areas for political 
attention. The CEO of the host municipality described it thusly: 
 
The information about child welfare in the regional council is very 
ad-hoc. I try to keep them informed, but there are so many other 
fields demanding attention. 
 
This statement indicates that the 2009 organizational model weakened the politi-
cal attention toward the specific area of child welfare.  
Several respondents underlined the problems of each municipality being too 
small to meet national standards within the field of child welfare. This led them 
to maintain cooperation in spite of a rather conflict-filled situation in the period 
between 1993 and 1996. In addition, the importance of the long history of the 
cooperation between the six municipalities was emphasized as an explanation for 
why cooperation was continued even after this period. The success of the model 
established in 1996 spurred an increased interest in cooperation in the municipal-
ities, which was further reinforced by the attention given by the regional council, 
research institutions and the national government. In addition, all respondents 
emphasized the importance of the leader’s competence and stability in explain-
ing the success of the cooperation.  
 
“North”-cooperation 
This cooperation consists of only two, equally-sized (just above 1000 inhabit-
ants) municipalities situated in the northernmost region of Norway. Distances are 
large, and the population is scattered. Infrastructural difficulties, combined with 
long winters and heavy weather, complicate physical transportation between 
centers. The initiative to establish a cooperative arrangement came from one of 
the municipalities in 2005, as a result of a serious crisis. The municipality was 
part of a trial involving 10 children, a trial that went through the whole legal 
system to the Supreme Court. The municipality lost, and had to pay a large com-
pensation. 
In the initial period, six municipalities were involved in a project focusing 
on the feasibility of a cooperative arrangement. This project was led by a board 
consisting of all CEOs in the six municipalities, with tight connections to the 
political level. In 2008, the two municipalities signed an agreement on “neighbor 
support”, according to which the two municipalities should discuss all cases 
together to obtain the necessary quality of decision. This rather informal agree-
ment was replaced by a formal cooperation in 2009, taking the form of a “host 
municipality”. An important premise for the creation of the cooperation was that 
both municipalities should guarantee a minimum of 1.5 FTEs earmarked for 
child welfare in each municipality. This increased the number of FTEs within the 
field from 1.7 in 2008 to 3.0 in 2009 – almost a doubling of resources. The re-
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sources were split evenly between the two municipalities, and it was decided that 
services, due to long distances, should be located in both municipality centers.  
The main reason for the success of the cooperation is assigned to the shared 
perception of crisis in both municipalities, with the Supreme Court decision 
being the “objective” evidence of total failure – or, as the mayor of the munici-
pality in question put it: “The service was so crisis-ridden that the need for co-
operation was self-evident.”All respondents underlined the feeling of crisis. One 
of the CEOs elaborated further: 
 
The arrangement with a host municipality has been much more effec-
tive than the previous “neighbor support” agreement, since the coop-
eration became much more formalized, and we got a clarification of 
the principles of financing between the two municipalities. 
 
The cooperation was thus not only based on a fixed agreement on how to finance 
the services, but also an agreement concerning on what level the services should 
be. Since the political councils in both municipalities decided on earmarking 1.5 
FTEs each, they also committed themselves to maintaining this level even when 
facing financial cuts. In the period following the creation of the cooperation, 
both municipalities have made several cuts in other municipal areas, but child 
welfare has been spared. The political level in both municipalities decided, 
through the creation of the cooperation, to move child welfare out of the ordi-
nary prioritizations between fields and sectors.  
The administrative and political anchoring of the cooperation is rather weak. 
The leader of the child welfare office meets with the CEOs twice a year, and 
none of the CEOs calls for more information. They feel adequately informed 
about what goes on in the field. Meetings between the leader of the child welfare 
services and the municipal councils are limited to once a year. None of the inter-
viewed politicians called for more information. As one of the mayors expressed 
it: 
 
It seems natural that the political attention decreases when something 
functions well. (…) the administrative leader of the cooperation and 
administrative leadership in the municipality are now the responsible 
(…) 
 
In addition, several respondents underlined the importance of an iterative, almost 
incremental process. As one of the CEOs said: 
 
The project period was a prerequisite for us to succeed. During that 
period, we met frequently in meetings and seminars, we discussed on 
a permanent basis how to increase competence in the field (…) Slow-
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ly, we built a common competence on, and understanding of, the 
field of child welfare. 
 
Both CEOs also emphasized how the process resulted in the two becoming better 
known to each other, and thus to the establishment of trust between them. Final-
ly, all respondents highlighted the importance of a new ICT-system making it 
easier to communicate over physical distances, given that the cooperation covers 
a very large geographical and sparsely populated area. 
 
Across-case analysis 
The most obvious common feature in all three cases is a significant increase in 
resources devoted to child welfare in the areas covered by the cooperations. This 
increase is significantly larger in the three cases (ranging from 13 % to a dou-
bling from before to after the formalized cooperation was established) than the 
national average in the corresponding periods. This increase coincides with the 
formalization and establishment of a more elaborate formal structure, both ad-
ministratively and politically. In two of the cases, a three-layered organization 
was constructed with an operative, an administrative and a political level. In the 
third case (“North”), a two-layered structure was constructed, but based on a 
political decision guaranteeing a stable financial basis that ensured a doubling of 
the resources assigned to the field. 
However, it is difficult to conclude that formalization is the most important 
cause for success; other research on organization of inter-municipal child wel-
fare shows that two- and three-layered formal organizations are the rule, not the 
exception (ECON, 2006; D. I. Jacobsen, 2014a; Leknes et al., 2013). A feature 
common to all three cases, however, is what has been termed “anchoring” – the 
cases are all characterized by a tight connection to the administrative top level, 
or a specialized political organ. In the case of “Mid”, child welfare was connect-
ed to a specialized political committee. Regarding “West”, the 2004 reorganiza-
tion resulted in political supervisory board manned by top politicians in the par-
ticipating municipalities, later coupled to the regional council where the same 
top politicians were in office. “North” is to some degree the exception, since it 
does not exhibit a clear political anchoring of the cooperation. 
On the other hand, “North” starts out with something that compensates for 
political anchoring, namely a political “guarantee” shielding the field of child 
welfare from prioritization decisions between municipal sectors and tasks. What 
all three cases have in common is that child welfare is “moved out” of the ordi-
nary municipality activity and given special attention, both politically and ad-
ministratively. Child welfare is thus “moved upward” in the prioritization hierar-
chy. It is moved out of the prioritization discussions involving areas within the 
health and social sector as a whole, and up to a level where child welfare be-
comes a separate area and is thus prioritized as a sector in itself. This is particu-
larly noticeable in “Mid”, where a separate political committee is devoted solely 
to child welfare. 
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All three cases also show a similarity in that there is sense of “crisis” among 
central actors in the municipality, both at the administrative and at the political 
level. This is most obvious in “North”, where a municipality was sued and lost in 
court. But also in the other two cases there was a sense of crisis, as shown by 
audits remarking that most of the municipalities (except for the largest in the 
“West” case) did not fulfill the legal minimum staff requirement. It is doubtful 
that the creation of inter-municipal cooperation would have activated the same 
energy if there were no perception of crisis. On a timeline, it seems that this 
sense of crisis is the basic building block for the construction of a well-
functioning inter-municipal cooperation.  
Finally, in all three cases the process exhibits incremental traits, where both 
previous problems and successes create new momentum for further integration 
and cooperation. The process is clearly characterized by a trial-and-error proce-
dure, something emerging most clearly in “West”, where cooperative arrange-
ments hark back to the early 1980s. But also in the other two cases we see pro-
cesses in which different alternatives are tested out, evaluated, and adjusted. 
Again, the common perception of crisis is probably a prerequisite for these more 
or less unbroken incremental processes. The incremental process could also be 
described as a continuous process of formalization. Cooperation in all three 
cases follows a path of rather informal contracts and cooperative arrangements in 
the beginning toward more elaborated formal structures and agreements later on.  
In addition, we find several unique explanations, like the role of “regional 
flagship” in “West”, the importance of a new ICT system in “North”, and the 
competence and stability of leadership in “Mid”.  
 
Discussion 
In theoretical terms, we find both structural and functional explanations for the 
success achieved in these three cases (Turrini et al., 2010). Initially, we focused 
on the role of governance structure of inter-municipal cooperation, i.e. the role of 
vertical structure in explaining cooperative success. One common characteristic 
of all three cases is that structural arrangements are completed to obtain and 
maintain a high level of resources. Common to all three cases is a structure that 
organizes a specific “focus of attention” to the field of child welfare (M.  
Egeberg, 2003; March & Simon, 1993). This is closely associated with what 
some authors call the “anchoring” of cooperation (Sanda, 2001) and others “in-
volvement of key stakeholders” (Evertsson & Rosengren, 2015). In all three 
cases, the inter-municipal cooperative arrangement is structurally “moved out” 
as a separate organization from the sector where it belongs in most municipali-
ties, together with other tasks in the health- and social area. In a “normal” mu-
nicipality, politicians and top management concentrate on prioritization between 
sectors, not individual services (Blåka et al., 2012). Resources devoted to a spe-
cific area like child welfare is thus a question of prioritizing between that area 
and other areas within the same sector. Prioritizations are made at the sector 
level, not the municipal level. Thus, the construction of the inter-municipal co-
Dag Ingvar Jacobsen and Charlotte Kiland 
 
 
 
68 
 
operative arrangements represents a decoupling of child welfare from the rest of 
the sector, shielding it from prioritizations between similar services.  
This structural decoupling is clearest in “Mid” and “West”, where child wel-
fare was organized in a separate organizational unit coupled directly to top ad-
ministrative levels as well as to specialized political organs. As Egeberg (2003) 
points out, this is a structural design that necessarily gives more attention to one 
area than to others. Actors within the field get easier access to important decision 
makers in the municipality – and increased attention and access leads in turn, as 
these three cases indicate, to more resources. The case of “North” is somewhat 
different, but here a decision shielding the field of child welfare from prioritiza-
tion considerations involving other areas was made by establishing a fixed level 
of resources devoted to the area.  
However, the structural arrangements would probably not have been insti-
gated were it not for a shared perception of crisis based on an understanding that 
what had been done before was unsatisfactory. This is probably the main func-
tional explanation for success, and should be regarded as the “building block” 
for the measures taken later during the cooperation. This factor does not neces-
sarily explain success directly, but rather explains the energy put into the estab-
lishment and maintenance of the cooperation. Behind the inter-municipal coop-
eration there is a constant “sense of urgency” (Kotter, 2008), making it difficult 
for any one partner in the collaboration to obstruct or – ultimately – leave it. In 
all three cases, we see strong – in the sense of clear and not too open to different 
interpretations (Jacobsen, 2014b) – cues from the environment in the forms of 
external audits, evaluations and legal processes pointing to legal deficiencies in 
the municipalities in question. This common sense of urgency in turn creates a 
strong commitment to doing something, and a willingness to find a unified solu-
tion.  
Theoretically, only three solutions exist. The first is to solve the problem 
alone. In the actual cases this seems mostly impossible, as it would require too 
much resources devoted to a small municipal area. The second is to amalgamate 
with other municipalities, while the third is to cooperate. For most municipalities 
cooperation is far more attractive than amalgamation, insofar as it can be regard-
ed as a much less radical change in the existing order (Steiner, 2003). A percep-
tion that only one solution is possible, combined with a very clear perception 
that something must be done, creates a strong pressure both on politicians and 
administrative leaders to succeed. This may explain why all municipalities in the 
three cases were willing to devote significantly more resources to the field of 
child welfare. 
In addition, all three cases indicate the importance of stepwise, incremental 
processes in establishing a well-functioning cooperation. This observation sup-
ports the idea that successful cooperation is something that is primarily achieved 
over time, through a series of successes and failures (Quinn, 1980). Again, this 
would have been easy if all three cases exhibited only successes form the start, 
as one could then show to the importance of “small wins” (Weick, 1984). On the 
contrary, in one of the cases there was a long period characterized by more prob-
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lems than successes. The key to understanding why a period like this does not 
lead to the dissolution of the collaboration is probably to be found in the main 
point mentioned earlier: a common perception of urgency, and that withdrawal 
or failure was not an option.  
As a conclusion, these three cases indicate that inter-municipal success can-
not be explained by a single factor, no single factor is more important than any 
other. Rather, it is a question of complex interaction between factors, where one 
or several factors only work favorably in the presence of other factors (Ragin 
1987). This study indicates that organizational structures and incremental pro-
cesses are important, but that these elements would probably not have had the 
same effect if the sense of urgency was missing. If this is correct, it will be much 
more difficult to establish and maintain a well-functioning collaboration in a 
situation where one or several participants do not share this perception. 
Finally, the findings in this study foster two further reflections. The first is 
on the democratic consequences of inter-municipal cooperation. In Norway 
(Ekspertutvalget, 2014; Røiseland & Vabo, 2016), Sweden (Anell & Mattison, 
2009), Denmark (Kjær, 2011), as well as in other European countries (R. Hulst 
& Montfort, 2007), inter-municipal cooperation has been criticized on the 
grounds that it reduces the opportunities for political governance. In short, it is 
argued that creation of single-purpose cooperative arrangements, governed by 
their own boards, diminishes the role of elected politicians by putting important 
activities (like child welfare) at “an arm’s length”. Inter-municipal cooperation is 
thus assumed to result in a decoupling of elected politicians and the services 
provided by the municipality. This study shows a different mechanism at work. 
In fact, the creation of inter-municipal cooperative arrangements in our three 
cases mainly led to a stronger vertical coupling between the political level and 
the child welfare services by conducting a horizontal decoupling of these ser-
vices from similar services within the same sector. In the situation before the 
inter-municipal arrangements, child welfare was “tucked away” in the adminis-
trative sector of health- and social matters. Only in very special instances was 
there a direct coupling between this specific area and the political level. Political 
governance focused on the sector as a whole, not on any specific service within 
that sector, leaving governance of the child welfare area mostly to administrators 
and professionals. Organizing the service as an inter-municipal arrangement 
brought central politicians and top managements directly in contact with the 
specific service in all cases. One can thus argue that political governance over 
that specific area was strengthened, not weakened. This stands in some contrast 
to the idea that inter-municipal arrangements in general will result in weakened 
opportunities for political governance.  
Still, the findings in this study come with a bitter aftertaste. One of the main 
findings is that success largely depends on the actual service being “moved out” 
of the ordinary municipal activity and given extra attention, both by the top 
management and the political leadership. The activity or task organized as an 
inter-municipal arrangement is coupled directly to political and/or administrative 
leaders, and thus becomes “shielded” from the process of prioritization between 
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areas and sectors that has to take place in all municipalities with responsibilities 
for several different tasks and services. If one looks only at the inter-municipal 
services, this factor is clearly a factor explaining “success”. But this success is 
limited to one service, one area or one task among many. One can rightly ask: 
Where are the resources given to the area of child welfare in all three cases taken 
from? Which other areas had to “suffer”? 
These questions bring us to another level, one where we can raise the ques-
tion of the “success” of a municipality as a whole, not only the “success” of a 
single area. One of the main theoretical arguments for delegating responsibilities 
within a state to lower levels of government is an assumption that decision mak-
ers “close to the people” are those in the best position to have a total oversight 
over needs in the population (Oates, 1972). Local authorities are assumed to be 
better than the state level at a) registering local wants and needs, and b) balanc-
ing between those needs and wants, since the state level is further removed from 
the people in the local constituency. The ability of local authorities to balance 
different areas regards efficiency on a higher level, by some called “allocative 
efficiency” (Brueckner, 1982; Shah, 1992) or “efficiency of prioritizing” (D. I. 
Jacobsen, 2014a). 
The study of the three cases reported in this article indicates that activities 
organized as inter-municipal arrangements are given extra attention as they are 
“taken out” of the ordinary municipal activities. As we know, attention is one of 
the really scarce resources in any political system (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 
2012; March & Olsen, 1989), and those winning the competition for political 
and administrative attention in a municipality will also win the competition for 
resources. Organizing municipal services as inter-municipal arrangements may 
lead to a fragmentation of the municipality, making it more difficult to obtain 
allocative efficiency. It is a puzzling thought that what causes success at one 
level (one service area) may be detrimental to success at a higher level (the total 
responsibility of a municipality), and that inter-municipal arrangements in gen-
eral and not only limited to the child welfare sector, may undermine higher-level 
efficiency.  
 
References 
Anell, A., & Mattison, O. (2009). Samverkan i kommuner och landsting - en 
kunskapsöversikt. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Baldersheim, H., Fimreite, A., & Strand, T. (1992). Interkommunalt samarbeid i 
Norden. Bergen: LOS-senteret. 
Baldersheim, H., & Rose, L. E. (2010). A Comparative Analysis of Territorial 
Choice in Europe - Conclusions. In H. Baldersheim & L. E. Rose (Eds.), 
Territorial Choice (pp. 234-259). Houndmills: Pakgrave Macmillan. 
Bel, G., Brown, T., & Warner, M. (2014). Editorial Overview: Symposium on 
Mixed and Hybrid Models of Public Service Delivery. International Public 
Management Journal, 17(3), 297-307. doi:10.1080/10967494.2014.935231 
Success With a Bitter Aftertaste 
 
 
 
71 
Bel, G., Fageda, X., & Mur, M. (2014). Does Cooperation Reduce Service De-
livery Costs? Evidence from Residential Solid Waste Services. Journal of 
Public Administration Research & Theory, 24(1), 85-107.  
Bel, G., & Warner, M. E. (2015). Inter-Municipal Cooperation and Costs: Ex-
pectations and Evidence. Public Administration, 93(1), 52-67. 
doi:10.1111/padm.12104 
Bel, G., & Warner, M. E. (2016). Factors explaining inter-municipal cooperation 
in service delivery: a meta-regression analysis. Journal of Economic Policy 
Reform, 19(2), 91-115. doi:10.1080/17487870.2015.1100084 
Benson, J. K. (1975). The Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 20(2), 229-249.  
Bigras, N., Bouchard, C., Cantin, G., Brunson, L., Coutu, S., Lemay, L., . . . 
Charron, A. (2010). A Comparative Study of Structural and Process Quality 
in Center-Based and Family-Based Child Care Services. Child & Youth 
Care Forum, 39(3), 129-150. doi:10.1007/s10566-009-9088-4 
Bjørnholt, B., & Salomonsen, H. (2015). Contracting and Performance in Agen-
cies: A Question of Control, Dialogue or Autonomy? Public Organization 
Review, 15(4), 509-530. doi:10.1007/s11115-014-0286-7 
Blåka, S., Tjerbo, T., & Zeiner, H. (2012). Kommunal organisering. Retrieved 
from Oslo:  
Brandtzæg, B. A., & Sanda, K. G. (2003). Vellykkede interkommunale tjenes-
tesamarbeid. Resultater fra en kartlegging høsten 2002. Retrieved from Bø:  
Brandzæg, B. A. (2006). Evaluering av forsøk med interkommunalt samarbeid 
om barnevern i Vest-Telemark. Retrieved from Bø:  
Brown, T. L., & Potoski, M. (2003). Managing Contract Performance: A Trans-
action Costs Approach. Journal of Policy Analysis & Management, 22(2), 
275-297.  
Brueckner, J. K. (1982). A Test for Allocative Efficiency in the Local Public 
Sector. Journal of Public Economics, 19(3), 311.  
Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2012). "A Garbage Can Model" at 
Forty: A Solution That Stills Attracts Problems. Research in the Sociology 
of Organizations, 36, 19-30. doi:10.1108/S0733-558X(2012)0000036005 
Cristofoli, D., & Markovic, J. (2016). How to Make Public Networks Really 
Work: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Public Administration, 94(1), 
89-110. doi:10.1111/padm.12192 
Cropper, S., Ebers, M., Huxham, C., & Ring, P. S. (Eds.). (2008). The Oxford 
Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Dijkgraaf, E., & Gradus, R. H. J. M. (2013). Cost advantage cooperations larger 
than private waste collectors. Applied Economics Letters, 20(7), 702-705. 
doi:10.1080/13504851.2012.732682 
Dollery, B., Byrnes, J., & Crase, L. (2008). Australian Local Government Amal-
gamation: A Conceptual Analysis Population Size and Scale Economies in 
Dag Ingvar Jacobsen and Charlotte Kiland 
 
 
 
72 
 
Municipal Service Provision. Australasian Journal of Regional Studies, 
14(2), 167-175.  
Dollery, B., & Grant, B. (2013). Symposium on Amalgamation and Financial 
Sustainability in Local Government: Part 2. Public Finance & Management, 
13(3), 142-147.  
Donabedian, A. (2005). Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care. Milbank Quar-
terly, 83(4), 691-729. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0009.2005.00397.x 
Drew, J., Kortt, M., & Dollery, B. (2015). What Determines Efficiency in Local 
Government? A DEA Analysis of NSW Local Government. Economic Pa-
pers, 34(4), 243-256. doi:10.1111/1759-3441.12118 
ECON. (2006). Interkommunalt samarbeid i Norge – omfang og politisk styring. 
Retrieved from Oslo:  
Egeberg, M. (2003). How bureaucratic structure matters: an organizational per-
spective. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), Handbook of public administra-
tion (pp. 116-126). London: Sage. 
Egeberg, M., Gornitzka, Å., & Trondal, J. (2016). Organization Theory. In C. 
Ansell & J. Torfing (Eds.), Handbook on Theories of Governance. Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar. 
Ekspertutvalget. (2014). Ekspertutvalget for god kommunestruktur. . Retrieved 
from Oslo:  
Evertsson, P., & Rosengren, K. (2015). Political experiences of changing the 
focus in elderly care in one municipality. Journal of Nursing Management, 
23(8), 994-1002. doi:10.1111/jonm.12245 
Fimreite, A., & Medalen, T. (Eds.). (2005). Governance i norske storbyer: mel-
lom offentlig styring og privat initiativ. Oslo: Scanndinavian Academic 
Press. 
Flermoen, S., & Sanda, K. G. (2004). Evaluering av felles sosial- og barne-
verntjeneste i Flesberg og Rollag. Førsituasjonen og foreløpige resultat et-
ter halvannet års drift. Retrieved from Bø:  
Gersick, C. J. G. (1991). Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Explora-
tion of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm. Academy of Management Re-
view, 16(1), 10-36. doi:10.5465/AMR.1991.4278988 
Gjertsen, A. (2014). Legitimacy in Interlocal Partnerships: Balancing Efficiency 
and Democracy. Urban Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.), 51(9), 1926-1942. 
doi:10.1177/0042098013502828 
Gradus, R., Dijkgraaf, E., & Wassenaar, M. (2014). Understanding Mixed Forms 
of Refuse Collection, Privatization, and Its Reverse in the Netherlands. In-
ternational Public Management Journal, 17(3), 328-343. 
doi:10.1080/10967494.2014.935237 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of 
Sociology, 78(6), 1360-1380.  
Hall, P. A., Taylor, R. C. R., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political science and the 
three new institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44(5), 936-957.  
Success With a Bitter Aftertaste 
 
 
 
73 
Hamilton, T. A. D., & Bundy-Fazioli, K. (2013). Exploring the Complexities of 
Child Neglect: Ethical Issues of Child Welfare Practice. Journal of Social 
Work Values & Ethics, 10(2), 14-24.  
Haug, A. V., Baldersheim, H., & Øgård, M. (2011). Internasjonale erfaringer 
med interkommunalt samarbeid. . Retrieved from Oslo:  
Heen, H. (2009). 'One Size Does Not Fit All'. Public Management Review, 
11(2), 235-253. doi:10.1080/14719030802685263 
Hefetz, A., & Warner, M. E. (2012). Contracting or Public Delivery? The Im-
portance of Service, Market, and Management Characteristics. Journal of 
Public Administration Research & Theory, 22(2), 289-317.  
Hoornbeek, J., Beechey, T., & Pascarella, T. (2016). Fostering Local Govern-
ment Collaboration: An Empirical Analysis of Case Studies in Ohio. Journal 
of Urban Affairs, 38(2), 252-279. doi:10.1111/juaf.12204 
Hulst, R., Montfort, A., Haveri, A., Airaksinen, J., & Kelly, J. (2009). Institu-
tional Shifts In Inter-Municipal Service Delivery. Public Organization Re-
view, 9(3), 263-285. doi:10.1007/s11115-009-0085-8 
Hulst, R., & Montfort, A. v. (2007). Inter-Municipal Cooperation: A Widespread 
Phenomenon. In R. Hulst & A. v. Montfort (Eds.), Inter-Municipal Cooper-
ation in Europe. . Dordrecht: Springer. 
Jacobsen, D. I. (2009). Perspektiver på kommune-Norge. Bergen: Fagbokforla-
get. 
Jacobsen, D. I. (2014a). Interkomunalt samarbeid i Norge. Bergen: Fagbokforla-
get. 
Jacobsen, D. I. (2014b). Organisasjonsendring og endringsledelse. Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget. 
Jacobsen, D. I. (2015). Regional Governance Networks: Filling In or Hollowing 
Out? Scandinavian Political Studies, 38(2), 115-136. doi:10.1111/1467-
9477.12037 
Jung, C., & Jeong, S.-H. (2013). Effects of Service Characteristics on Interlocal 
Cooperation in U.S. Cities: A Pooled Regression Analysis. International 
Journal of Public Administration, 36(5), 367-380. 
doi:10.1080/01900692.2013.767273 
Keast, R., & Mandell, M. (2014). The collaborative push: moving beyond rheto-
ric and gaining evidence. Journal of Management & Governance, 18(1), 9-
28. doi:10.1007/s10997-012-9234-5 
Kelly, J. M., & Swindell, D. (2002). A Multiple–Indicator Approach to Munici-
pal Service Evaluation: Correlating Performance Measurement and Citizen 
Satisfaction across Jurisdictions. Public Administration Review, 62(5), 610-
621.  
Kjær, U. (2011). Interkommunalt samarbeijjde i Danmark. Internasjonale erfa-
ringer med interkommunalt samarbeid – sammenligninger og oppsummer-
ing fra seks land. Retrieved from Kristiansand:  
Klijn, E.-H. (2008). Governance and Governance Networks in Europe. Public 
Management Review, 10(4), 505-525. doi:10.1080/14719030802263954 
Dag Ingvar Jacobsen and Charlotte Kiland 
 
 
 
74 
 
Klijn, E.-H., & Skelcher, C. (2007). Democracy and Governance Networks: 
Compatible or Not? Public Administration, 85(3), 587-608. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00662.x 
Klijn, E. H., Sierra, V., Ysa, T., Berman, E., Edelenbos, J., & Chen, D. Y. 
(2016). The Influence of Trust on Network Performance in Taiwan, Spain, 
and the Netherlands: A Cross-Country Comparison. International Public 
Management Journal, 19(1), 111-139. doi:10.1080/10967494.2015.1115790 
Knox, H., Savage, M., & Harvey, P. (2006). Social networks and the study of 
relations: networks as method, metaphor and form. Economy & Society, 
35(1), 113-140. doi:10.1080/03085140500465899 
Kotter, J. P. (2008). A Sense of Urgency. Boston. MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Kvello, Ø., & Wendelberg, C. (2003). Det kommunale hjelpeapparatet for barn 
og unge. Kommunestørrelse relatert til organisering av, samarbeid mellom 
og effektiviteten i hjelpeapparatet. Retrieved from Steinkjær:  
Langset, M., & Vinsand, G. (2010). Fylkesintiativ for økt samarbeid om bar-
nevern i Sør-Trøndelag. . Retrieved from Oslo:  
Leknes, E., Gjerstad, A., Holmen, A. K., Lindeløv, B., Aars, J., Leknes, I., & 
Røiseland, A. (2013). Interkommunalt samarbeid. Konsekvenser, muligheter 
og utfordringer. Retrieved from Stavanger:  
Mandell, M. P., & Keast, R. (2008). Evaluating the effectiveness of interorgani-
zational relations through networks. Public Management Review, 10(6), 
715-731. doi:10.1080/14719030802423079 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering INstitutions. The Organiza-
tional Basis of Politics. . New York: Free Press. 
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1993). Organizations (2 ed.). Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell. 
Masuch, M. (1985). Vicious Circles in Organizations. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 30(1), 14-33.  
Mattisson, O., & Ramberg, U. (2015). Governance versus Ownership in Jointly 
Owned Local Government Organisations: The Case of VA SYD (Water and 
Sewage South). In C. Bernier & L. Bernier (Eds.), Public Enterprises To-
day: Missions, Performance and Governance: Learnings from Fifteen Cases 
. Bruxelles: Peter Lang. 
Nilsen, J. K., & Vinsand, G. (2007). Evaluering av interkommunalt samarbeid i 
Midt-Telemark. . Retrieved from Oslo:  
Oates, W. (1972). Fiscal federalism. New York: Hartcourt Brace Javoanovich 
Inc. 
Patton, M. Q. (1999). Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analy-
sis. Health Services Research, 34(5), 1189-1209.  
Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. I. (2006). Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-thruths & Total 
Nonsense. . Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Pierre, J. (2011). Cost-efficiency and public interest in inter-local partnerships. 
Urban Research & Practice, 4(1), 13-22. 
doi:10.1080/17535069.2011.550494 
Success With a Bitter Aftertaste 
 
 
 
75 
Pollitt, C., Talbot, C., Caulfield, J., & Smullen, A. (2004). Agencies: How Gov-
ernments Do Things through Semi-Autonomous Organizations. . Basing-
stoke: MacMillan Palgrave. 
Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do Networks Really Work? A Frame-
work for Evaluating Public-Sector Organizational Networks. Public Admin-
istration Review, 61(4), 414.  
Quinn, J. B. (1980). An incremental approach to strategic change. McKinsey 
Quarterly(1), 34-52.  
Raab, J., Mannak, R. S., & Cambré, B. (2015). Combining Structure, Govern-
ance, and Context: A Configurational Approach to Network Effectiveness. 
Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 25(2), 479-511. 
doi:10.1093/jopart/mut039 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so Differ-
ent After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust. Academy of Management 
Review, 23(3), 393-404. doi:10.5465/AMR.1998.926617 
Røiseland, A., & Vabo, S. I. (2016). Styring og samstyring - governance på 
norsk. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
Sand, R., Aasetre, J., & Lysø, R. (2007). Evaluering av Innherred samkommune. 
. Retrieved from Bø:  
Sanda, K. G. (2001). Hvordan lykkes med interkommunalt samarbeid? Retrieved 
from Bø:  
Schreyer, P. (2012). Output, Outcomes, and Quality Adjustment in Measuring 
Health and Education Services. Review of Income & Wealth, 58(2), 257-278. 
doi:10.1111/j.1475-4991.2012.00504.x 
Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and Organizations. Ideas and Interests. (3 ed.). 
Los Angeles: Sage. 
Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study 
Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Re-
search Quarterly, 61(2), 294-308.  
Shah, A. M. (1992). Empirical tests for allocative efficiency in the local. Public 
Finance Quarterly, 20(3), 359.  
Short, J. C., & Payne, G. T. (2008). First Movers and Performance: Timing Is 
Everything. Academy of Management Review, 33(1), 267-269. 
doi:10.5465/AMR.2008.27752850 
Sletnes, I. (2003). Juridiske rammebetingelser for interkommunalt samarbeid om 
særlovsoppgaver. Retrieved from Oslo:  
Steiner, R. (2003). The causes, spread and effects of intermunicipal cooperation 
and municipal mergers in Switzerland. Public Management Review, 5(4), 
551-571.  
Sydow, J., Schreyogg, G., & Koch, J. (2009). Organizational Path Dependence: 
Opening the Black Box. Academy of Management Review, 34(4), 689-709. 
doi:10.5465/AMR.2009.44885978 
Tjerbo, T. (2009). Vertskommunesamarbeid i norske kommuner. Resultater fra 
en kartlegging høsten 2009. Retrieved from  
Dag Ingvar Jacobsen and Charlotte Kiland 
 
 
 
76 
 
Turrini, A., Cristofoli, D., Frosini, F., & Nasi, G. (2010). Networking Literature 
About Determinants of Network Effectiveness. Public Administration, 
88(2), 528-550. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01791.x 
Van Dooren, W., Bouckaert, G., & Halligan, J. (2015). Performance Manage-
ment in the Public Sector. Oxon: Routledge. 
Verweij, S., Klijn, E.-H., Edelenbos, J., & Van Buuren, A. (2013). What Makes 
Governance Networks Work? A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analy-
sis of 14 Dutch Spatial Planning Projects. Public Administration, 91(4), 
1035-1055. doi:10.1111/padm.12007 
Vinsand, G., & Nilsen, J. K. (2008). Erfaringer med dagens samarbeid og 
vurdering av alternative styringsmodeller i MNR. Retrieved from Oslo:  
Warner, M. E. (2011). Competition or Cooperation in Urban Service Delivery? 
Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics, 82(4), 421-435. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8292.2011.00450.x 
Weick, K. E. (1984). Small Wins. Redfining the Scale of Social Problems. . 
American Psychologist, 39(1), 40-49.  
Weick, K. E., & Quinn, R. E. (1999). Organizational change and development. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 50(1), 361.  
Weijie, W. (2016). Exploring the Determinants of Network Effectiveness: The 
Case of Neighborhood Governance Networks in Beijing. Journal of Public 
Administration Research & Theory, 26(2), 375-388. 
doi:10.1093/jopart/muv017 
Wendelborg, C., Sand, R., & Aasetre, J. (2008). Forsøk med felles barne-
verntjeneste i Midtre Namdal. Sluttevaluering. Retrieved from Steinkjær:  
Yin, R. K. (2014). Case Study research. Design and Methods. (5 ed.). Los Ange-
les: Sage. 
Zafra-Gómez, J. L., Prior, D., Díaz, A. M. P., & López-Hernández, A. M. 
(2013). Reducing Costs in Times of Crisis: Delivery Forms in Small and 
Medium Sized Local Governments' Waste Management Services. Public 
Administration, 91(1), 51-68. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.02012.x 
Zeemering, E. (2016). Assessing local elected officials’ concerns about interlo-
cal agreements. Urban Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.), 53(11), 2347-2362. 
doi:10.1177/0042098015590768 
Zeemering, E. S. (2012). The Problem of Democratic Anchorage for Interlocal 
Agreements. American Review of Public Administration, 42(1), 87-103. 
doi:10.1177/0275074010397532 
 
Notes 
 
1 All numbers from 2010. 
